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**HAITI**  
**AND THE**  
**UNITED STATES**  
**IN 1922**

**A BRIEF**  
**ON THE INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF THE REPUBLIC**  
**OF HAITI BY THE FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES**



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## HAITI AND THE UNITED STATES IN 1922

Haiti was an independent republic from 1804 to 1915. In 1804 she won independence from France, but in 1915 the United States deprived her of independence by taking virtual control of her government and by placing a force of marines in military occupation of the country. A special committee of the United States Senate is now investigating the American occupation and administration of this little Caribbean negro republic. The facts discussed in this statement are drawn from the record of the recent public hearings of this Committee, public documents such as the reports of the Secretary of the Navy, and in a few instances from other historical sources. The Senate, the State Department and the President will be called upon in the early months of 1922 to consider the immediate future of Haiti in its relation to the United States. Shall the independence of Haiti be restored? Shall Haiti continue to be controlled by the United States? If we retain control, upon what terms and to what end shall it be exercised?

The United States maintains marines in Haiti and exercises its control over the native government under a treaty with Haiti signed in September, 1915. At this moment when the future of Haiti depends upon the results of the present investigation, we deem it to be of the first importance that the basis and justification for the control of Haiti by the United States should be known and weighed. This question far transcends in importance the secondary questions of the extent to which the United States control has benefited Haiti and the alleged "atrocities" committed by our marines. From the following history of American intervention in Haiti, it will be seen that the United States, seeking an opportunity to gain a control in Haiti, took advantage of internal disorders to force this treaty upon Haiti by the direct use of military force exercised by our naval vessels and a considerable body of our marines, by the declaration and enforcement of martial law, by the seizure and withholding of the funds and revenues of the Haitian Government. The knowledge that the United States has acted the part of the bully to force its control upon a weak country in a time of turmoil has come as a painful shock to us, as it will to every patriotic American. The first disclosure of the pertinent facts was made in the report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1920; the complete disclosure was forced by the present Senate investigation.

The problem of Haiti is not academic; it involves directly the good faith and honor of the United States and our policy toward the weaker countries of the Caribbean and Latin America. Haiti today is confronted with the need of establishing an educational system and of maintaining an adequate native police force, with the problems of foreign investments, of financial and administrative reform—of twentieth-century progress.

Behind these practical needs loom the questions: Why has the United States made of Haiti a virtual dependency? What is the basis of United States occupation and control? In September, 1915, there was concluded between Haiti and the United States a ten-year treaty, whereby the United States assumed entire control of the Haitian customs, the maintenance of order through a constabulary force officered by American marines, and in large measure the control of the expenditures and debts of Haiti and the direction of sanitation and public improvements. As the treaty puts it: "an efficient aid for the preservation of Haitian independence and the maintenance of a Government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty."<sup>1</sup> The interests of Haiti are expressly and by every implication the predominant [practically the sole] objects of the treaty.

### HAITI BEFORE 1915

To understand the circumstances under which the treaty was negotiated and the motives of the United States in assuming this direction of the affairs of another country, the history and characteristics of Haiti must be considered briefly.

The population, in number somewhat less than 3,000,000, is of pure African negro blood, except for some admixture of white blood in the upper class.

The people are largely illiterate and there is no middle class, except in the larger towns. A small upper class is highly educated and cultured. Prior to the occupation of 1915 there were no roads, travel and communication between north and south was non-existent, the schools system was totally inadequate, the government weak and inefficient. The country was then and is now exceedingly primitive.

As a French colony the people of Haiti suffered all the horrors of a cruel slavery, so that a century of independence has not effaced the fear of foreign intervention and domination. As a measure of protection against the alien white rule the several constitutions of Haiti have contained provisions rigidly excluding foreigners from ownership of land.

The people of Haiti speak French and Creole: their cultural traditions are entirely French and their chief relations with the outside world have been with France. Their several foreign loans were all contracted in France. For many years prior to the American intervention Haiti had always paid regularly the interest on her foreign debt. The National Bank of Haiti, the sole depository for Government funds, vested with the privileges of note emission, is a French corporation. Four-fifths of its capital stock was owned or held in France, the remaining one-fifth by New York banking interests. In 1920 the entire assets were purchased by a large New York bank. Foreign investments in Haiti, prior to the American occupation, were relatively small, and the number of foreigners living there very limited.

Haiti and Santo Domingo, the other republic on the island, have



long been suspicious of possible attempts by the United States to gain a footing in or complete control of their territories. Since 1847 the United States has in fact made several attempts to obtain control of the harbors of Samana Bay on the eastern coast of the Dominican Republic, and of Mole St. Nicholas on the northwest coast of Haiti for avowed use as naval bases. The attempt very nearly succeeded as to Samana Bay, but the Haitians have always refused to consider cession or lease of Mole St. Nicholas.

In 1891 the United States sent Admiral Gherardi with a considerable fleet to the capital of Haiti, Port-au-Prince, to treat with the Haitian Government for the cession or lease of Mole St. Nicholas; the Haitians declined even to discuss the proposal and the United States withdrew its fleet.

During the years immediately prior to 1915 there had been several revolutions, much internal disturbance, frequent changes of government and presidents. In brief, a weak "backward" nation of blacks, but none the less intensely proud of its independence, of its status as a recognized sovereign nation signatory to the Hague Convention of 1907, a nation jealous of foreign encroachment.

No foreigners had ever been molested in any internal disturbances, foreign investments were respected and interest on the foreign debt was scrupulously paid. Weak and disrupted internally, Haiti nevertheless presented a united front to other nations; her disturbances at home afforded no fair excuse for foreign intervention.

## **INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES**

Why did the United States land marines and naval forces in Haiti in July, 1915, seize the principal towns, the funds and the customs service of the government, proclaim martial law and present for signature to a new government, held in office by force, the treaty for American control of the little country? The motives and aims professed in the treaty itself were solely the welfare and stability of Haiti. The extent and weight of other motives are somewhat a matter of speculation, but the facts which suggest other motives cannot be ignored.

American banking interests had a one-fifth ownership and partial control of the National Bank of Haiti and also held the bonds of the national railroads. After the outbreak of the European War the American representatives of these interests assumed a large part of the management of the Bank at the request of the French participants. The United States had in the past tried to obtain Mole St. Nicholas as a naval base. The island of Haiti lies between Cuba and Porto Rico and is one link in the chain of islands screening the Panama Canal. Naval experts may say in 1922 that the United States is not interested in Mole St. Nicholas as a naval base, but the messages which passed between Washington and the commander of our naval forces in Haiti during the

critical period of the intervention show that at that time we were still interested in the acquisition of Mole St. Nicholas. It is significant that this interest apparently passed with the firm establishment of American occupation in Haiti and with the purchase from Denmark of the Virgin Islands.

The United States had since 1907 been administering the customs service of the Dominican Republic and was to seize complete control of that country in 1916. The European War broke out in August, 1914, German commerce raiders were still at large in 1915 and German traders controlled most of the commerce and industry in Haiti. The Monroe Doctrine might come into play at any moment.

Some or all of these considerations played a part in our intervention in July, 1915: disinterested help to Haiti in her internal problems was not the sole motive.

On six occasions during 1914 and 1915 the United States made direct overtures to secure control of Haitian customs; all of these came to nothing. Finally, the disturbances of July 27, 1915, afforded the pretext for securing this control.

In October, 1914, Mr. Bryan, Secretary of State, wrote to President Wilson saying: "It seemed to me of first importance that the naval forces in Haitian waters should be at once increased, not only for the purpose of protecting foreign interests, but also *as evidence of the earnest intention of this Government to settle the unsatisfactory state of affairs which exists.*"<sup>2</sup> More naval vessels were accordingly sent to Haitian waters at this time and at the same moment the United States offered to assist the President of Haiti then threatened by revolutionary disturbances, upon certain conditions, which were refused. In November and December, 1914, the State Department laid down certain conditions, including control of the Haitian customs houses, for the recognition of a new president. The Haitians again declined. On December 10th the American Minister formally presented a project for the control and administration of the Haitian customs by the United States; this was refused by Haiti.

On December 13, 1914, the United States, without any preliminary warning to the Haitian Government, landed marines at Port-au-Prince from the U. S. S. "Machias"; these marines proceeded to the vaults of the National Bank of Haiti and carried away by force \$500,000, which was taken on to the "Machias" and carried to New York. This money was the property of the Haitian National Government, and was on deposit in the bank for the redemption of paper money. This *coup* was arranged with Mr. Bryan, Secretary of State, by the American director of the National Bank of Haiti, representing the American interests, the reason given being that the Bank feared revolutionary activities and owing to the European War could not secure ocean insurance upon the carriage of this money to the United States. This money belonged, not to Americans or Europeans, but to the Haitian Government, and was



merely in the custody of the Bank to redeem outstanding paper currency. The Haitian Government protested immediately against this violation of its sovereignty and asked for an explanation, which was never vouchsafed. In 1916 the Bank contracted to return these funds to Haiti, to the credit of the Haitian Government.

In March, 1915, the United States sent a special mission to Haiti to negotiate for American control, which was again refused. This was followed in May, 1915, by a further commission, which presented to the Haitian Government a project for United States military protection and intervention, arbitration of claims by foreigners, and the prohibition of the cession or use of Mole St. Nicholas to any other government. To this proposal the Haitian Government presented a counter project for financial and military aid, carefully drawn to limit absolutely the extent and duration of military aid by the United States in suppressing internal disorders. These proposals again came to nothing.

On July 27, 1915, revolutionary disorders broke out at Port-au-Prince in which the murder of the President followed a massacre of political prisoners. For the moment there was no Haitian Government, but in the disturbances no foreigners were killed or molested. The following day American naval and marine forces in Haitian waters under the command of Admiral Caperton, U.S.N., landed and occupied Port-au-Prince, and shortly afterwards, the other principal ports and towns in the Republic. The Admiral's messages of these days to the Navy Department state specifically that he had acquired and exercised control of the internal situation and that governmental functions were being carried on by a body of citizens acting under his directions. A few days later the Admiral directed this committee of citizens to resign and gave orders for the restoration of the government treasury service to the National Bank of Haiti, from which it had been removed previously by the Haitian Government.

The Admiral's daily reports to Washington reflect the situation at the Haitian capital, the march of events, the influence exerted by the United States in the election of the new president, and in the negotiation and acceptance of the treaty.

The Haitian chambers were in session and were about to proceed to the election of a new president, but under orders from the State Department Admiral Caperton twice induced the Chambers to postpone the election. American naval officers at the capital canvassed the political situation carefully. Several prominent and universally respected Haitian citizens were asked to be candidates for the presidency, but all refused. One of them, M. Leger, former Minister at Washington, characterized by Lord Pauncefoot as "the ablest diplomat he had ever known,"<sup>3</sup> refused upon the ground that he was for Haiti, not for the United States, and that he would have to wait and see what the United States would demand of Haiti in order to be in a position to defend Haitian interests. When Sudre Dartiguenave, President of the Senate, proclaimed himself a

candidate for election to the presidency of the Republic and offered if elected president to accede to any terms which the United States might wish, including customs control and the cession of Mole St. Nicholas, Admiral Caperton notified Washington accordingly. He advised that breaking up the bands of revolutionaries by United States forces was imperative if the United States desired at this time "to negotiate treaty for financial control of Haiti."<sup>4</sup> The State Department, "by the instruction of the President," requested the Navy Department to send a sufficient force of marines to control the situation absolutely and Caperton was instructed that the United States favored the election of Dartiguenave.<sup>5</sup>

Such policy as had then been formulated in Washington was expressed in a message in which the Navy Department directed the Admiral "by proclamations and otherwise to assure the Haitians that the United States had no aim except to insure, establish and help maintain Haitian independence, and the establishment of a firm and stable government by the Haitian people. \* \* \* It is the intention to retain United States forces in Haiti only so long as will be necessary for this purpose."<sup>6</sup>

In the meantime, the State Department had advised the American Minister at Port-au-Prince of the procedure he should follow to assist the Haitian Congress in electing a president, saying that the United States would expect to be entrusted with customs control and such financial control as might be deemed necessary. The night before the election, American naval officers informed the senators, deputies and candidates for president of the intentions and policy of the United States, as set forth in the proclamations.

On August 12th M. Dartiguenave was elected President, Admiral Caperton's chief-of-staff being on the floor of the voting hall, and American marines guarding the approaches. The election was free in the sense that the deputies and senators voting were not terrorized by revolutionary groups, but on the other hand the situation, precipitated by the events of July 27th and 28th, was such that the naval and marine forces under Admiral Caperton clearly exercised a strong influence in favor of Dartiguenave. American intervention was a *fait accompli*; American military control was growing from day to day. The State and Navy Departments were kept fully informed of all developments, and the presence and activities of our naval forces were specifically directed from Washington.

On August 14th, two days after the election of Dartiguenave, the State Department notified the American Legation at Port-au-Prince to submit to the Haitian President at once the draft of a treaty providing for control of customs and finances and military intervention by the United States; the Legation was instructed to advise the Haitian President that "The Haitian Congress will be pleased to pass forthwith a resolution authorizing the President-elect to conclude without modification the treaty submitted by you."<sup>7</sup> The Legation complied. Such a treaty was submitted on the 17th of August. Negotiations for the acceptance and ratification of the treaty were thereafter carried on by



Admiral Caperton and his naval officers in conjunction with the Legation. On the 19th of August, Admiral Caperton was notified that the State Department desired him to assume charge of the ten principal customs houses in Haiti, to collect the customs dues, to use the funds for the organization of a constabulary and temporary public works, and to support the new Haitian Government. The funds were to be deposited in separate accounts in the name of Admiral Caperton, the United States Government holding these funds "in trust for the people of Haiti."<sup>8</sup> Admiral Caperton carried out these instructions and between the 21st of August and the 2nd of September seized the customs houses at the ten principal ports. For several months naval officers collected all customs dues and made all disbursements. This deprived the Haitian Government of all income whatsoever, as the customs houses were practically the sole sources of national revenue.

In response to the order of August 19th, Admiral Caperton sent a long message to the Navy Department, reading in part as follows:

"Following message is secret and confidential. United States has now actually accomplished a military intervention in affairs of another nation. Hostility exists now in Haiti and has existed for a number of years against such action. Serious hostile contacts have only been avoided by prompt and rapid military action which has given the United States a control before resistance has had time to organize. We now hold capital of country and two other important seaports."<sup>9</sup>

The seizure of the customs houses aroused the strongest opposition on the part of the people, and the Haitian Government, in a series of notes addressed to the American Charge d'Affaires, protested vigorously against the violation of their sovereignty. No explanation or apology was ever offered by the Government of the United States.

In the meantime, the Haitian Government was considering the draft of the treaty submitted to it on the 17th of August. The President was favorable to the treaty, but opposition to it was growing in the cabinet and the chambers due to "fear of sentiment throughout the country against the American customs control, propagated constantly during the last few years by the faction leaders."<sup>10</sup> The President and the Cabinet thereupon threatened to resign for this same reason. Admiral Caperton recommended to the Navy Department that in the event of the resignation of the new Haitian Government, a military government should be established, with an American officer as military governor, but said significantly, "Present is most critical time in relations with Haiti, and our decision now will, to a great extent, determine future course. If military government is established, we would be bound not to abandon Haitian situation until affairs of country are set right and predominant interests of United States of America secured."<sup>11</sup>

By early in September the augmented forces under command of Admiral Caperton were in complete control of all the principal towns and routes in Haiti, had seized all the sources of national revenue,

were controlling all the national funds, and expending these funds directly, without turning over any portion of them to the Haitian Government. Public order and the public purse were completely in the hands of the Navy Department. On September 3, 1915, Admiral Caperton declared martial law in the City of Port-au-Prince by proclamation, in which he announced:

"\* \* \* In order to afford the inhabitants of Port-au-Prince and other territory hereinafter described the privileges of the Government, exercising all the functions necessary for the establishment and maintenance of the fundamental rights of man, I hereby, under my authority as commanding officer of the forces of the United States of America in Haiti and Haitian waters, proclaim that martial law exists in the city of Port-au-Prince and the immediate territory now occupied by the forces under my command.

I further proclaim, in accordance with the law of nations and the usages, customs and functions of my own and other Governments, that I am invested with the power and responsibility of Government in all its functions and branches throughout the territory above described; and the proper administration of such Government by martial law will be provided for in regulations to be issued from time to time, as required by the commanding officer of the forces of the United States of America in Haiti and Haitian waters.

The martial law herein proclaimed, and the things in that respect so ordered, will not be deemed or taken to interfere with the proceedings of the constitutional Government and Congress of Haiti, or with the administration of justice in the courts of law existing therein; which do not affect the military operations or the authorities of the Government of the United States of America.

\* \* \*''<sup>12</sup>

On September 8th, Admiral Caperton sent this message to the commanding officer of the battleship "Connecticut" in northern Haitian waters:

"Successful negotiation of treaty is predominant part present mission. After encountering many difficulties treaty situation at present looks more favorable than usual. This has been effected by exercising military pressure at propitious moments in negotiations. Yesterday two members of cabinet who have blocked negotiations resigned. President himself believed to be anxious to conclude treaty. At present am holding up offensive operations and allowing President time to complete Cabinet and try again. Am therefore not yet ready to begin offensive operations at Cape Haitien but will hold them in abeyance as additional pressure. Take no offensive action except such necessary to protect life and property and hold town for the present. Keep me fully informed of food situation."<sup>13</sup>



Naval officers were constantly urging the members of the Government to accept the treaty, pointing out the necessity of its acceptance without modification. The treaty was finally signed by the Haitian Government on September 16th, 1915, and although not ratified by the United States until May, 1916, a *modus vivendi*, providing for the immediate application of the treaty, was followed.

This treaty, consisting of sixteen articles, promised aid by the United States to Haiti "in the proper and efficient development of its agricultural, mineral and commercial resources and in the establishment of the finances on a firm and solid basis";<sup>14</sup> provided for a receivership of customs, including the collection and application of all customs dues, the appointment of a financial adviser to deal with all the financial matters of Haiti. The treaty prescribed the purposes to which the customs receipts were to be applied by the Receiver General. The United States later succeeded in forcing its view that legislation, to be effective, must have the approval of the American treaty officials. The treaty provided for the selection of a native constabulary, to be officered by Americans appointed by the President of the United States, no cession or lease of any Haitian territory to any other governments, put the sanitation and engineering works of the country under the control of American engineers, and by general terms bound the United States to help Haiti to maintain an independent government adequate for the protection of order.

Under the Haitian Constitution, the treaty had to be ratified by the Senate and the Chamber to be binding. To assist in its prompt ratification, the Haitian Government asked for an immediate assurance that the United States would procure a temporary loan to the Haitian Government, and represented that it had no funds at its disposal even to pay salaries and current expenses. Exercising further pressure upon the Government, Admiral Caperton, under instructions from Washington, seized a consignment of unsigned bank notes for the Haitian Government, notifying the Navy Department that the notes would be signed by the National Bank and turned over to the Haitian Government "immediately after ratification of the convention."<sup>15</sup> The issue of these notes had previously been authorized by the Haitian Government. The Admiral and the Charge d'Affaires separately requested the authorities in Washington to permit the former to turn over to the Haitian Government funds sufficient for current expenses and for the payment of back salaries. The Admiral informed President Dartiguenave that "funds would be immediately available upon ratification of the treaty. The President seemed utterly discouraged and pointed out once more that the delay was not due to any lack of effort by himself or his cabinet; that withholding of funds only gave another weapon to the opposition, and that if the United States Government persists in withholding all funds ratification becomes so difficult that he and his cabinet will resign rather than attempt the fight in the senate under this handicap."<sup>16</sup>

Finally, on October 3rd, Secretary Daniels authorized Admiral Caperton to arrange with the Haitian Government for a weekly amount



necessary to meet its current expenses, saying also "Question payment back salary will be settled by Department immediately after ratification of treaty."<sup>17</sup> The Navy Department inquired several times of Admiral Caperton why ratification of the treaty was being delayed, the Admiral replying that as he had continually received assurances that a majority in the Senate favored the treaty, he had "refrained from taking any steps which might appear as using force to secure ratification."<sup>18</sup> On October 6 the Chamber of Deputies ratified the treaty. It was still necessary to obtain the ratification of the Haitian Senate.

In the meantime, the funds collected at the several customs houses were being applied by the naval collectors to the expenses of the constabulary, public works and the like, without any payment of the interest charges on the Haitian public debt, to which the customs service had previously been lawfully pledged by prior Haitian Governments. In fact, the treaty provisions for the use of customs funds for this purpose after paying the expenses of the receivership, were never complied with by the American Receiver General until 1920, although the customs gave sufficient funds to meet demands of other categories of expenses which, according to the treaty, were secondary to the foreign loan service.

On November 3d Admiral Caperton stated to President Dartigue-nave that, referring to the treaty "the only objections are unimportant technical points and abstract principles. These and other details can be arranged later."<sup>19</sup>

On November 5th the Senate Committee made a report on the treaty accepting some provisions and suggesting modification of others. A few days later one of the American naval vessels in Haitian waters made a special trip to bring a new Haitian Senator to Port-au-Prince in order to secure his vote for ratification of the treaty.

On November 10th Washington ordered the Admiral to act as follows:

"\* \* \* Arrange with President Dartiguenave that he call a cabinet meeting before the session of senate which will pass upon ratification of treaty and request that you be permitted to appear before that meeting to make a statement to President and to members of cabinet. On your own authority state the following before these officers: 'I have the honor to inform the President of Haiti and the members of his cabinet that I am personally gratified that public sentiment continues favorable to the treaty; that there is a strong demand from all classes for immediate ratification and that the treaty will be ratified Thursday. I am sure that you gentlemen will understand my sentiment in this matter, and *I am confident if the treaty fails of ratification that my Government has the intention to retain control in Haiti until the desired end is accomplished*, and that it will forthwith proceed to the complete pacification of Haiti so as to insure internal tranquillity necessary to such development of country and its industry as will afford relief to the starving populace now unemployed. Meanwhile the present Government will be supported in the effort to

secure stable conditions and lasting peace in Haiti, whereas those offering opposition can only expect such treatment as their conduct merits. The United States Government is particularly anxious for immediate ratification by the present senate of this treaty, which was drawn up with the full intention of employing as many Haitians as possible to aid in giving effect to its provisions, so that suffering may be relieved at the earliest possible date. Rumors of bribery to defeat the treaty are rife, but are not believed. However, should they prove true, those who accept or give bribery will be vigorously prosecuted.' It is expected that you will be able to make this sufficiently clear to remove all opposition and to secure immediate ratification. Acknowledge. Daniels."<sup>20</sup>

The Admiral complied. The following day, November 11th, the treaty was ratified by the Senate.

From the first of August, 1915, until long after the ratification of the treaty, the situation in Haiti can best be described in the words of Admiral Caperton: "The status of our administration in Haiti was at this time purely one of military control."<sup>21</sup> During this period offensive military operations were conducted by our forces against Haitian revolutionaries which resulted in some loss of life to Haitians.

## HAITI UNDER THE TREATY

During the greater part of the six years since the ratification of the treaty, martial law has been maintained in Haiti by our marines and martial law is in force there today. Although there have been repeated trials and sentences by provost courts and military commissions, our Congress has never declared war against Haiti.

The Haitian chambers were dissolved in 1917, for the second time since the invasion, and there have been no elections in five years. Not a few Haitians welcomed the original offer of our friendly aid in July, 1915, as a means of escape from the chaos of the moment. First disillusioned by our seizure of their national revenues and funds, and then by the successive coercive steps taken by the United States, they were long ago thoroughly disappointed not only by the lack of any constructive policy instituted in their behalf but the suppressive measures which completely violated the spirit of our professed intentions. Knowing that the treaty was imposed by duress, that the treaty has not been adhered to by the United States, the people of Haiti are now demanding its abrogation, abolition of martial law and the restoration of national institutions suppressed during the years of the occupation. Under a subsequent protocol for a loan the receivership of customs and the financial control would be retained during the life of a loan. The Haitian Government is now considering a loan offered by financial interests in the United States. Haiti is thus, under the present status, tied hand and foot to the United States, under a treaty forced upon them by military occupation, fear of the consequences of martial law and the forcible seizure and withholding of all national funds.



## THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT IN HAITI

In the spring of 1917 the Senate and Chamber of Deputies were in session considering the draft of a new constitution for the country (submitted by American officials). Much opposition existed to several provisions of the proposed new constitution, chiefly to one which would allow foreigners to acquire and own land. The President and Cabinet favored the draft; a deadlock was imminent. Thereupon the President dissolved the Chambers. Since then there have been no elections and no sessions of the Chambers, now defunct. Such semblance of government as remains in the hands of the native Haitians is exercised by the President, a cabinet and a council of state whose members hold office solely during the pleasure of the President. It is common knowledge now in Haiti that the present government remains in power only by the support and presence of our marines.

The term of President Dartiguenave expires on May 15, 1922. Under the new Haitian constitution, the president is chosen by the Senate and Chambers in joint meeting; the senators and deputies are chosen by direct popular vote in January of an even year, indicated by presidential decree. No call for an election in January, 1922, was issued and there can hardly be any chambers in session in April to elect a president for the new term commencing May 15th. There will thus be either a vacancy, or the present incumbent or a nominal successor will be appointed by the Council of State. In any event the government after May 15, 1922, will be less and less representative, even of the small educated class. It is not unreasonable to assume that Washington could without difficulty induce the Haitian Government to proceed to the election of chambers and of a successor to President Dartiguenave this spring. It is only with such a new Haitian Government that any negotiations for a re-alignment of Haitian-American relations or for a long-term loan could fairly be carried on. To negotiate with the Government of President Dartiguenave would be in keeping with the methods used in 1915 to force acceptance of the treaty.

## CONCLUSIONS

From the foregoing summary of the salient facts of our intervention in Haiti and of the present status of the Haitian Government, we deduce these general and specific conclusions:

(1) The presence of our military forces in Haiti after the disturbances of July 27-28, 1915, had quieted down, was violative of traditional American principles.

(2) The seizure and withholding by our forces of Haitian national funds in 1915 was a violation of international law and of repeated professions by responsible American Government officials of our position and attitude toward Latin-American republics and weaker governments.



(3) The imposition and enforcement of martial law and the conduct of offensive operations in Haiti by Admiral Caperton prior to the acceptance of the treaty by Haiti was an equally clear violation of international law.

(4) The methods employed by the United States in Haiti to force acceptance and ratification of the treaty framed by the United States representatives, namely the direct use of military, financial and political pressure, violate every canon of fair and equal dealing between independent sovereign nations, and of American professions of international good faith.

(5) The maintenance in Haiti of any United States military force or of the control exercised by treaty officials under cover of the treaty of September, 1915, is now a knowing participation in the wrong of the original aggression.

(6) The present native government of Haiti elected in 1915 and unsupported by any elected representatives since 1917, is at the end of its term of office; no negotiations should be had with this present government which involve the future of Haiti on any material aspects of the situation.

(7) To the functions of the Navy Department as established by law have been added by mere executive action, unauthorized by Congress or by other sanction of law, the functions of a department of colonies and dependencies. This we condemn as essentially illegal and as a usurpation of power.

Finally, we declare, without qualification, that the honor and good name of the United States, the right of Haiti to fair dealings from the United States, and a future of honorable relations with Latin America, all require that

**A. The treaty of 1915 be abrogated by the United States, without conditions.**

**B. Elections for the legislative body and for the presidency be permitted forthwith in Haiti.**

**C. A new treaty for friendly aid by the United States to Haiti be negotiated with a new Haitian Government upon such terms as shall be mutually satisfactory to both countries and by methods of free consent.**

## REFERENCES

<sup>1</sup> Official report of hearings before a Select Committee of the United States Senate pursuant to Senate Resolution 112 authorizing a special committee to inquire into the Occupation and Administration of the territories of the Republic of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. P. 206.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. P. 338

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. P. 320

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. P. 313

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. P. 315

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. P. 313

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. P. 327

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. P. 334

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. P. 335

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. P. 336

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. P. 338

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. P. 348

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. P. 353

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. P. 204

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. P. 380

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. P. 381

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. P. 383

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. P. 387

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. P. 391

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. P. 394

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. P. 404

